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Yet, despite its add-on quality, his final chapter offers sensible
generalizations. The Court, he argues, tends toward one of two
courses in national security cases. Either it offers ritualistic approval of the challenged actions, or it invokes variants on the political question doctrine to avoid the issues. Notwithstanding efforts
to link decisions to unique situations, the former course embeds pernicious doctrines in the Constitution, which makes the latter course
preferable although hardly unproblematic. Better still is an approach that defers decisions. May especially recommends that
judges utilize the requirement of ripeness, but also allow litigants to
return later without meeting roadblocks on mootness grounds.
May's discussion of these points is at a high enough level of generality to make detailed responses difficult-and a little unfair. Suffice
it to say that as history the final chapter's tie to the post-Armistice
interlude is slight.

TWO JEWISH JUSTICES: OUTCASTS IN THE PROMISED LAND. By Robert A. Burt.1 Berkeley: University of
California Press. 1988. Pp. 165. $19.95.
Melvin 1 Urofsky2
Professor Robert Burt's interpretive essay on Louis Brandeis
and Felix Frankfurter is at once provocative and frustrating. Professor Burt often throws out a brilliant insight that helps us to understand these two men, yet he does not and cannot provide the
type of evidence that would confirm his basic thesis-that their Jewishness shaped their judicial outlook. Being Jewish, even as marginally Jewish as these two, must have affected their lives in some
ways. Yet Burt's elucidation of how and why their Jewishness led
to their jurisprudence is far from convincing.
Burt first became attracted to this topic when, as he relates, he
noticed the very high percentage of fellow Jews teaching in law
schools such as Yale and Harvard. This led him to wonder why
Jews entered the profession, and this in turn led him to the careers
of Brandeis and Frankfurter, "two Jews who attained great prominence at a time when the American legal profession generally was
inhospitable to Jews." He began his research, and concluded that
"Jewishness was distinctively associated with outsider status, with
homelessness, for both Brandeis and Frankfurter." Their different
I.
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responses to this outsider status had "direct relevance to the issues
confronted today by all judges in America, and by all Americans,
whether Jews or gentiles."
The two men, however, did not react to their outsider status in
the same way. Brandeis, according to Burt, could have moved "inside," either into the regular community or into the mainstream of
the Jewish community, but instead he chose to be an outsider. As
an example, Burt notes that in the fight over his confirmation to the
Supreme Court, leaders of the American bar accused Brandeis of
not conforming to the canons of the profession. Brandeis "always
acts the part of a judge toward his clients instead of being his client's lawyer."3 Later on, however, even friends complained that
Brandeis as a judge too often appeared to be an advocate. "If you
could hint to Brandeis," Harold Laski wrote to Holmes, "that judicial opinions aren't to be written in the form of a brief it would be a
great relief to the world."4 Thus Brandeis as a lawyer crossed over
into being a judge, and as a judge still remained something of a
lawyer, and at all times stood at a margin.
The experience of being an outsider himself gave Brandeis "an
instinctive sympathy for outsiders," and this in tum explains his
support of reform legislation, both as an advocate and as a judge.
Brandeis, according to Burt, espoused judicial restraint because he
believed that the purpose of much reform legislation was to help
outsiders move inside, to become equal partners in the society. He
himself, however, chose to remain an outsider, even when a member
of the High Court, the insiders' citadel of citadels.
Frankfurter, on the other hand, did not like outsider status.
An immigrant, he embraced American citizenship with a passion
far exceeding that of most native-born Americans. Admitted to
Harvard Law School, he became the great champion of that school,
holding it up as the paragon to which all other schools should aspire. The Court, of course, became the holy of holies for him, and
he condemned any and all who did not revere it as he did.
According to Burt, Frankfurter thus saw himself as "a quintessential insider," and like most converts, he was more zealous than
those born to the faith. As evidence, he cites Frankfurter's majority
opinion in Minersville School District v. Gobitis, and then his
anguished dissent in the second flag salute case which overturned
his Gobitis opinion. Frankfurter's jurisprudence, according to Burt,
reflected his gratitude at being allowed "inside," and thus he de3. A.T. MASON, BRANDEIS: A fREE MAN'S LIFE 506 (1946).
4. Letter from Harold Laski to Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., (January 13, 1918), reprinted in I THE HOLMES-LASKI LEITERS 127 (M.D. Howe ed. 1953).
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ferred to the majoritarian will when it chose to keep others outside.
Despite the fact that he had taken up Brandeis's role as counsel to
the National Consumers' League and had defended protective labor
legislation, Frankfurter never had Brandeis's "instinctive sympathy
for outsiders." Once having entered the citadel, he preferred to
keep the rest of the great unwashed out.
The resulting judicial attitudes are described by Burt as those
of priest and prophet. Prophets are always and everywhere outsiders, telling unpleasant truths to those who do not want to hear, demanding that people be better than they are, that they adhere to
higher truths. Brandeis the prophet (whom Franklin Roosevelt
called "Isaiah") preached a law that was compassionate and open,
designed to break down the barriers that prevented people from attaining a full and equal role in society. It is this attitude, Burt
claims, that informed the zeitgeist of the Warren Court, which in
decisions affecting segregation and rights of the accused followed
the Brandeisian call for compassion and equality. Thus, in Trop v.
Dulles,5 the Court struck down a congressional statute that removed citizenship status from members of the armed forces convicted of desertion during wartime, on the ground that deprivation
of citizenship was a cruel and unusual punishment.
Dissenting in Trop, Frankfurter displayed the attributes of the
"priest," the quintessential insider, the keeper of the rituals, the one
who adheres to legal formalities. During war, the country needed
soldiers; those who shirked that duty could be expelled from the
"communion of our citizens."6 For Frankfurter, the zealous convert, the grateful insider, no punishment seemed too great for those
who, for whatever reason, flouted the rituals. Priests fear change
that would upset the rules and endanger the status of the priests. If
the Brandeis/prophet view informed the Warren Court, the Frankfurter/priest view shaped the Burger Court.
Burt's dichotemy is attractive, and gives us a valuable perspective on the differences between Brandeis and Frankfurter. But he
has not convinced me that the insider-outsider attitudes are caused
by Jewishness. One is reminded of that old saw about Jewish dentists-they drill from right to left. It is one thing to take someone
like Chaim Weizmann, Brandeis's great opponent in the Zionist
movement, and show that his Jewishness shaped his life. It is far
more difficult to do so in the cases of Brandeis and Frankfurter.
By all accounts, Jewishness played a very minor role in Bran5.
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deis's upbringing.7 He never denied his Jewishness, but for the first
fifty years of his life never treated it as more important than the
color of his hair. Allon Gal has shown that Brandeis did suffer
from anti-Semitism, 8 and Ben Halpern has argued that Jewish feelings and ideas permeated the Brandeis family far more than many
had supposed. 9 Neither case, however, is that strong. Much of the
resentment shown by proper Boston to Brandeis can be attributed
to his espousal of unpopular causes, plus the fact that he was not a
warm, outgoing person.
While there was some anti-Semitic comment during the battle
over Brandeis's nomination to the Court, a close reading of the
lengthy hearings, and of the many letters that flooded into the
White House, shows that his critics were mainly upset over his allegedly radical economic views as well as his unorthodox legal
practices.
Frankfurter's youth had far more Jewishness in it than that of
his mentor, but at an early age he abandoned the faith, to and except
through his Zionist work (which he did only at Brandeis's request)
had very little to do with organized religion thereafter. II This is not
to say that he ignored the issue of anti-Semitism. He fought strenously against A. Lawrence Lowell's efforts to impose a Jewish
quota at Harvard in the 1920s,I2 and he worked hard to place his
bright students, especially his Jewish students, in good places in
government and academia.I3
Brandeis had an aloof, unapproachable personality-like many
gentiles. Frankfurter was his opposite in this respect-ebullient
and at times nasty-again, like many gentiles. To reverse Shakespeare, does not a gentile bleed when pricked and cry when hurt?
Are there not gentiles as well as Jews who are compassionate and
want to see outsiders let into the social communion? Are there not
gentiles as well as Jews who, having themselves become insiders,
want to keep others out? As a foundation for his theory, Burt needs
7. L.J. PAPER, BRANDEIS ch. I (1983); P. STRUM, LOUIS D. BRANDEIS: JUSTICE FOR
THE PEOPLE ch. I (1984).
8. A. GAL, BRANDEIS OF BosTON 169-73 (1980).
9. B. HALPERN, A CLASH OF HEROES: BRANDEIS, WEIZMANN, AND AMERICAN ZIONISM 62-71 (1987).
10. FELIX FRANKFURTER REMINISCES 289 (H. Phillips ed. 1960).
II. At the end of his life, however, Frankfurter requested that his memorial service be
conducted by Louis Henkin, because "he is my only close personal friend who is also a practicing, orthodox Jew .... I carne into the world a Jew and although I did not live my life
entirely as a Jew, I think it is fitting that I should leave as a Jew." FROM THE DIARIES OF
FELIX FRANKFURTER 89 (J. Lashed. 1975).
12. M.E. PARRISH, FELIX FRANKFURTER AND HIS TIMES 156-57 (1982).
13. G.E. White, Felix Frankfurter, the Old Boy Network, and the New Deal: The Placement of Elite Lawyers in Public Service in the 1930s, 39 ARK. L. REV. 631 (1986).

1990]

BOOK REVIEW

123

to adduce evidence that these syndromes are much more common
among Jews than among others.
There are also errors of omission and commission that undermine the book's credibility. In the very first chapter on Brandeis,
Burt asserts that "Brandeis is the founding father of the Jewish
presence in American law," a startling claim to anyone familiar
with the career of Louis Marshall, who not only was self-consciously Jewish, but whose prominence as a lawyer equalled or surpassed that of Brandeis.t4 And in the first paragraph dealing with
Frankfurter, Burt asserts that "for Brandeis their friendship was apparently the most intimate male relationship in his adult life." This
ignores the lengthy and extremely close ties between Brandeis and
his brother Alfred, to whom Brandeis wrote nearly every day of his
life.t5

THE LIMITS OF JUDICIAL POWER: THE SUPREME
COURT IN AMERICAN POLITICS. By William Lasser.'
Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press. 1988.
Pp x, 354. $32.95 cloth, $9.95 paper.
Herbert Hovenkamp2

Professor William Lasser takes issue with one of the most respectable maxims of constitutional theory: the idea that controversial Supreme Court decisions expend part of the Court's stock of
political "capital,"3 thereby reducing its authority. The premise of
this maxim is that the Court is a fragile institution. If it wishes to
preserve its authority and guarantee maximum compliance with its
orders, the power of judicial review must be exercised very sparingly. For Alexander Bickel and even more so for Jesse Choper,
this thesis was a central part of an elaborate argument for judicial
restraint. "[I]n some principled fashion," Choper concluded, the
14. SeeM. ROSENSTOCK, LOUIS MARSHALL: DEFENDER OF JEWISH RIGHTS (1965);
LOUIS MARSHALL: CHAMPION OF LIBERTY (2 vols. C. Rezinkoff eel. 1957).
15. LETTERS OF LOUIS D. BRANDEIS passim (5 vols. M.l. Urofsky & D.W. Levy eds.
1971-1978).
I. Assistant Professor of Political Science, Clemson University.
2.

Professor of Law, University of Iowa.
A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE
BAR OF POLITICS 23 (1962); J. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL
PROCESS: A fUNCTIONAL RECONSIDERATION OF THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT !56
(1980); R.G. MCCLOSKEY, THE AMERICAN SUPREME COURT 229-31 (1960). See a/so J.
ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980); W. MURPHY, CONGRESS AND THE COURT 2-3
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